Search results for " Strong Equilibrium"

showing 2 items of 2 documents

Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium

2014

This paper focuses on oligopolistic markets in which indivisible goods are sold by multiproduct firms to a continuum of homogeneous buyers, with measure normalized to one, who have preferences over bundles of products. Our analysis contributes to the literature on private, delegated agency games with complete information, extending the insights by Chiesa and Denicolò (2009) to multiproduct markets with indivisibilities and where the agent's preferences need not be monotone. By analyzing a kind of extended contract schedules -mixed bundling prices- that discriminate on exclusivity, the paper shows that efficient equilibria always exist in such settings. There may also exist inefficient equil…

Economics and EconometricsSequential equilibriumjel:D4105 social sciencesjel:C72Trembling hand perfect equilibriumSymmetric equilibrium050301 educationjel:D21jel:D43Multiproduct Price Competition Delegated Agency Games Mixed Bundling Prices Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Strong EquilibriumSubgame perfect equilibriumMicroeconomicssymbols.namesakeSubgameNash equilibriumEquilibrium selection0502 economics and businessjel:L13symbolsEconomicsEpsilon-equilibrium0503 educationMathematical economics050205 econometrics
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Delegated agency in multiproduct oligopolies with indivisible goods

2010

This paper focuses on oligopolistic markets in which indivisible goods are sold by multiproduct firms to a continuum of homogeneous buyers, with measure normalized to one, who have preferences over bundles of products. Our analysis contributes to the literature on delegated agency games with direct externalities and complete information, extending the insights by Berheim and Whinston (1986, a , b) to markets with indivisibilities. By analyzing a kind of extended contract schedules - mixed bundling prices - that discriminate on exclusivity, the paper shows that efficient equilibria always exist in such settings. There may also exist inefficient equilibria in which the agent chooses a subopti…

jel:D41jel:C72jel:L13jel:D21jel:D43Multiproduct Price Competition Delegated Agency Games Mixed Bundling Prices Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Strong Equilibrium
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